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Implications of recent changes in banking 




This paper examines the relationship between recent changes in banking systems in emerging market 
economies and the conduct of monetary policy at the operational level. The focus is on the mechanics 
of monetary policy operations, and changes in the effectiveness of the transmission of policy impulses 
to the wider economy.  
To anticipate the conclusions, the progressive switch to market-based monetary policy techniques has 
generally made it easier for central banks to guide the economy. More open and deregulated financial 
markets have on balance helped. Market-based monetary policy techniques are able to influence 
people’s behaviour even when they are outside the central bank’s regulatory net, with additional 
transmission channels coming into play. Even more importantly, the adoption of market-based 
techniques is usually accompanied by more purposeful and transparent monetary policy frameworks 
that improve signalling. 
After a brief review of the links between monetary policy operations and the structure of the financial 
system in theory, relevant evidence on the operation of these links in practice is examined. The paper 
then discusses the evolving monetary policy transmission mechanism, relating those changes to 
developments in the structure of the banking system. A conclusion follows. 
1.  Monetary operations and financial system structure: in theory 
It is natural that central banks would select the tools most suited to the task. Thus the tools used to 
affect monetary conditions would be mainly a function of two things: the monetary policy target and the 
state of financial system development. With underdeveloped financial systems, especially those 
dominated by (unsophisticated) banks, central banks would tend to directly regulate the lending and 
deposit-taking activities of banks as the chief method for exerting influence over monetary conditions.
2 
Conversely, with sophisticated, developed financial systems where money and capital markets 
compete with banks, central banks would tend to use indirect, market-friendly methods. This pattern 
seems clearly evident in Table 1 below. 
Given this perspective, changes in banking system structure and behaviour will lead to changes in 
monetary policy operations, as central banks find that the old tools of direct intervention and regulation 
are less effective and the new market-based indirect tools more effective. The differences between 
direct and indirect monetary instruments have been well documented, as has the relationship between 
the effectiveness of the different approaches to monetary policy implementation at different stages of 
financial system development (see for example Alexander et al (1995), BIS (1996), IMF (2004)). 
Moreover, this description of the issue seems to fit well with the experience of advanced countries in 
                                                       
1  The research assistance of Pablo Garcia-Luna is gratefully acknowledged. Helpful suggestions were received from Bill 
White, Philip Turner, Ramon Moreno and Madhusudan Mohanty. 
2  For example, “From the time of its establishment in 1950, the Bank of Korea … in practice [] long had to rely on direct 
regulatory instruments because direct regulation was more effective in manipulating the money supply under the situation in 
which the financial markets remained underdeveloped and there was a chronic excess demand for funds” (Bank of Korea 
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the 1970s and 1980s, when direct monetary policy instruments were progressively abandoned in 




Use of operational tools of monetary policy at various stages of development 
As a percentage of the total sample 
  Developing countries  Emerging countries  Developed countries 
Credit and interest rate controls  4  22  0 
Liquid asset ratios (LAR)  65  30  7 
Reserve requirements  100  96  70 
Discretionary, market-based ops  96  96  100 
Open-ended/standing facilities  96  96  100 
Source: IMF (2004). Data relate to 23 countries in each of the three categories, as at the end of 2001. 
 
2.  Monetary operations and financial system structure: in practice 
Starting in the 1980s but especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, emerging market economies also 
modernised monetary policy operating procedures, essentially along the same lines that the 
developed economies had earlier.
5 That can be seen in Table 2, which highlights the main features of 
operating procedures used in emerging market economies. However, market-based operating 
procedures have been adopted even though banking systems continue to show noticeable structural 
differences relative to those in developed economies. For example, in many emerging market financial 
systems, secondary debt markets still have little depth. This complicates the idea that central banks 
tune interventions to match the financial system’s structure. A somewhat different perspective is that 
the choice of operating procedure reflects preferences as to regulatory style. Adoption of market-
based mechanisms tends to coincide with the choice to deregulate product markets and capital 
markets. In turn, markets adapt. In this perspective, central banks need not wait for financial markets 
to evolve a sufficient degree of sophistication. Instead, they can promote the necessary change by 
leading the innovation. 
The main features of monetary operations in emerging market economies (summarised in Table 2) 
are: 
1.  There is now a high degree of uniformity in the way that monetary policy is implemented 
across the emerging market world. The chief characteristics of the now-dominant approach 
are: 
(a)  Short-term money market interest rates are the main operating target. Transmission to 
other interest rates is almost wholly through the incentive effects of altered relative 
interest rates, ie market forces. 
                                                       
3  The sole exception has been the retention in some cases of minimal reserve ratio requirements to ensure a non-zero 
demand for central bank cash, the idea being that a more stable fulcrum for market operations results. But to reduce the 
distortion arising from the associated implicit tax, mandatory reserve balances are typically remunerated at close to market 
rates. 
4  Borio (1997a) provides a comprehensive account of the state of play towards the end of this transition to market-based 
instruments. 
5  Van ’t dack (1999) provides a discussion of the early part of this modernisation phase. See also Hawkins (2005). BIS Papers No 28  125
 
(b)  Standing facilities are often used to bound departures of short-term interest rates from 
target, sometimes in the form of a quite narrow interest rate “corridor”. 
(c)  In the majority of cases where standing facilities provide an automatic mechanism for 
supplying central bank cash consistent with the target, active open market operations 
are used to reduce the variance of interest rates around the operating target. 
(d)  In those cases where standing facilities are set at large distances (in interest rate 
terms) from the target, active open market operations are used to ensure that the 
supply of central bank cash is consistent with the target. 
(e)  Open market operations are mostly conducted by way of competitive tenders. 
2.  As these characteristics also describe the dominant approach used in developed countries, 
there is also considerable uniformity between the groups. 
3.  Interest rate controls and direct limits on lending have been almost totally removed (the most 
important exceptions being some sectoral lending preferences that remain in force in Brazil, 
China, India, Korea and Venezuela; and residual interest rate controls in China, India and 
Russia). Reserve ratio requirements have been substantially reduced, and remuneration of 
mandatory reserve holdings is more commonplace (see also Annex Table 9). 
4.  Much of the transformation of monetary policy operating procedures to market-based 
arrangements had already taken place by the end of the 1990s. 
Clearly, some points of difference remain between typical operating procedures used in the emerging 
market economy (EME) group and the developed market group. Three countries in the EME group 
use the exchange rate as the operating target, and operating procedures are tuned accordingly. For 
the others, the main points of difference relate to: the residual use of lending directives or “guidance”; 
active adjustments of reserve ratios for monetary policy purposes in some cases; and incomplete 
remuneration of required reserves even in situations where the ratio requirement is non-trivial. 
Nonetheless, it is quite striking how many of the EMEs now rely on highly conventional approaches to 
policy implementation. 
Indeed, exceptions to a clearly interest rate-focused operating procedure are increasingly rare. Seven 
EMEs stand out as having distinctive approaches. As noted, three - Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and 
Venezuela - have the exchange rate as the focus, consistent with either a fixed exchange rate or (in 
Singapore’s case) an exchange rate operating target. Singapore’s approach is the most unusual, 
marrying an exchange rate operating objective with a price stability mandate. The Monetary Authority 
of Singapore has managed to escape the normal traps associated with this potentially internally 
inconsistent arrangement by maintaining sufficient flexibility on the exchange rate target in the face of 
shocks to the equilibrium real exchange rate.
6 
Four countries have ostensibly continued to use bank liquidity - essentially, bank deposits at the 
central bank - as one of the main operating targets of monetary policy implementation. In India and 
Russia, the level of bank liquidity targeted at any one point in time is not made clear. Nor, early on, 
were the respective central banks very clear about what configuration of short-term interest rates and 
bank liquidity would be judged appropriate to meet monetary policy objectives. Over time, however, 
both central banks have become more explicit about the desired level of short-term interest rates. Both 
now set a corridor for overnight interest rates by way of standing deposit and borrowing facilities for 
banks at specified interest rates. Judging by revealed behaviour, in both cases the volume of bank 
liquidity supplied or accommodated has progressively become subsidiary to the operational interest 
rate objective. 
In Mexico, the Bank of Mexico has until recently also had an operational focus on bank liquidity. 
Unlike in India and Russia, the size of the “corto” - the (negative) quantity targeted - was well known 
and was in fact the major signalling device. While continuing to use cortos (“shortages”) to affect 
demand for bank liquidity in order to amplify the effect of changes in supply, since the spring of 2004 
the Bank of Mexico has been much more explicit about the short-term interest rates it intends to 
achieve. In short, as in India and Russia, the operational focus for monetary policy has shifted 
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increasingly towards a defined short-term interest rate configuration, even if such a configuration 
remains short of being called a target. 
Table 2 
Main characteristics of operating procedures 
Arrangements in mid-1990s















Asia        
China MONEY    ARR, 
DIR-MS 
ICONTROL 







 ERATE  FXOPS   













STIR  PDS, OMO  ARR 
Korea BKLIQ+STIR  OMO, 
STAND 
ARR  STIR  OMO, 
STAND 
RR 
Malaysia MTIR  OMO,  CORR  ARR, 
DIR-MS 
GDEP 
STIR CORR,  OMO  RR 
Philippines …    …  STIR  OMO,  CORR 
RDISC 
ARR 
Singapore ERATE FXOPS RR  ERATE FXOPS RR 
Thailand BKLIQ,  STIR 
ERATE 
OMO RR,  DIR-MS  STIR  OMO, CORR  RR 
Latin America        
Argentina ERATE  FXOPS, 
RDISC, OMO





CORR, OMO  ARR  STIR  OMO, RDISC  RR 
Chile STIR





ARR STIR OMO, CORR  RR 
Mexico BKLIQ  OMO  ARR
4  BKLIQ+STIR  PDS+CRAU
C 
 
Peru  BKLIQ   RR     
Venezuela MONEY    …  ERATE FXOPS,  PDS  RR 
Europe        
Czech Republic  …  …  RR, GDEP  STIR  CORR, OMO  RR, GDEP 
Hungary ERATE  OMO,  RDISC 
FXOPS 
RR STIR  CORR,  PDS  RR 
Poland STIR  …  ARR  STIR  CORR,  OMO  RR 
Note: For footnotes and a key to acronyms, see the end of the table. 
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Table 2 (cont) 
Main characteristics of operating procedures 
Arrangements in mid-1990s















Other        
Algeria  … … … … … … 

















Saudi Arabia  ERATE  OMO, RDISC 
FXOPS 
RR, DIR-MS  ERATE  OMO, 
FXOPS 
RR 
Turkey     …  STIR  OMO,  CORR  RR 
Key: 
… = information not yet available 
ARR = active (ie adjusted for monetary policy reasons in last five years) reserve requirement  
BKLIQ = bank liquidity or money base 
CORR = corridor of short-term interest rates formed by standing facilities [Note: when listed before OMOs, the 
corridor is judged to be the stronger of the two determinants of monetary conditions] 
CRAUC = credit auction 
DIR-MS = directions, credit ceilings and/or moral suasion 
ERATE = exchange rate 
FXOPS = foreign exchange operations (automatic or discretionary) 
FXSWAP = FX swaps for domestic liquidity management 
GDEP = government deposits which can be shifted at the central bank’s discretion to or from commercial banks
ICONTROL = interest rate controls 
MONEY = money growth 
MTIR = medium-term interest rates (three- to six-month) 
NDA = net financial assets (maximum) 
NFA = net financial assets (minimum) 
OMO = open market operations in secondary markets 
PDS = primary debt sales 
RDISC = rediscount lending 
STAND = standing credit facilities, with interest rates adjusted for monetary policy reasons [Note: = CORR 
when essentially unlimited in size - subject to collateral - and coupled with standing deposit facilities] 
STIR = short-term interest rate (overnight to two-month) 
SURR = surrender requirements for FX 
1  Information extracted from Kamin et al (1998), Van ’t dack (1999) and national sources.   
2  Bolded items in the body of the 
table highlight important changes in practice.   
3  Indexed (ie real) rate.   
4  While Mexico does not use a reserve requirement 
(average cash balances at the central bank are normally targeted at zero), in August 1998 commercial banks were required to 
make special (remunerated) deposits at the Bank of Mexico in a measure designed to tighten liquidity conditions. 
 
In Argentina, the monetary programme is specified in terms of a base money target range, which is 
adjusted annually in the light of perceived changes in base money demand in order to keep overall 
monetary conditions consistent with policy objectives. Although there are standing facilities at posted 
interest rates which create the appearance of an interest rate corridor, it is unclear to what extent 
those interest rate settings are adjusted to ensure consistency with the money base target range. In 
other words, the use of the corridor as an instrument of monetary policy is not clear.  
To examine the relationship between the operational approach and the structure of the banking 
system, an index of the use of non-market monetary policy instruments (NMMPI) was constructed and 
related to various structural indicators. Details on index construction and the resulting values are 
provided in Annex Table 9. It suffices to say here that the index weighs most heavily the use of interest 128  BIS Papers No 28
 
rate controls, direct control on credit creation and allocation, and active adjustments of reserve ratios 
where no interest is paid on required reserves. 
Graph 1 provides a selection of indicators of banking system structure, plotted against the NMMPI 
index.
7 The only relationship that shows any strength is that between the NMMPI index and 
government ownership of banks (left-hand panel, middle row). This is consistent with the view that 
government ownership weakens managers’ incentives to pursue profit-maximising strategies, which in 
turn weakens their likely responsiveness to price signals. In such circumstances, central banks might 
choose to use direct controls of various forms. It is also consistent with an argument that preferences 
with respect to regulatory style are revealed both in choices on the monetary policy operational 
approach and bank ownership. To the extent that one can detect a positive relationship between use 
of non-market instruments for monetary policy and overall restrictiveness on entry into the banking 
system and bank activities (right-hand panel, bottom row), the thesis that regulatory preferences 
dominate is further supported. (This direction of causation question is explored further in the next 
section.) 
Apart from the relationship between the NMMPI index and government ownership of banks, there is 
very little consistent relationship evident between the approach taken to monetary policy operations 
and banking system structure.
8 
Understanding causation 
As discussed earlier, it is unclear in principle whether changes in operating procedures should be 
regarded as a response to changes in financial system structure, or the other way around. Or indeed 
whether both are a function of attitudes towards market determination of prices in the economy. We do 
not have the data necessary to test for causation. A fundamental difficulty is that banking system 
structure and operating procedures both evolve progressively, over a number of years. And causation 
probably runs in both directions. 
In preparing for this meeting, central banks were asked whether recent changes in operating 
procedures were caused by, or were intended to cause, changes in banking system structure. As the 
major innovations were in place by the early 1990s in a large number of cases, relatively few central 
banks were able directly to answer the question. Those answers that were provided are, however, 
informative. 
In the central and eastern European cases, the main trigger for reform has been the accession-related 
need to converge on European Union practices. This has been true for the Czech Republic, where 
arrangements are now essentially identical with those of the European Central Bank. The story is very 
similar in Hungary and Poland, although reserve requirements remain slightly higher than in western 
Europe. 
At the same time, in all three countries central banks hoped that these changes in operating 
procedures would induce beneficial changes in banking system behaviour, including promoting the 
development of a liquid interbank market, partly by incentivising banks to manage their own liquidity 
positions (especially important in the Polish case), and thereby reducing the volatility of short-term 
interest rates (cited by the Czech and Polish central banks). Reductions in the implicit tax burden on 
banks associated with lowering reserve requirements and remunerating required reserves were 
intended in all three countries to reduce a tendency towards disintermediation. 
                                                       
7  It should be noted that two of the indicators of banking system structure are indices constructed by Barth et al (2002). As 
with many such indices drawn from attempts to place numerical values on qualitative factors - including the index 
constructed for this paper - the accuracy of the indices’ representation of the respective structural factors should be taken 
with a grain of salt. This is especially so for difficult-to-measure issues such as the quality of corporate governance and the 
nature of regulatory constraints. 
8  There is some hint of a positive relationship between the NMMPI index and the productive efficiency of the banking system 
as proxied by operating costs as a ratio of total assets (right-hand panel, top row). This, however, is a counterintuitive result 
which collapses once India is removed from the sample, which removes the positive slope, indicating that the relationship is 
not robust. BIS Papers No 28  129
 
Graph 1 
Overall index of non-market monetary policy instruments 
(NMMPI, x-axis) against selected variables (y-axis) 


































































































































































































































































AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; HK = Hong Kong SAR; 
HU = Hungary; IN = India; ID = Indonesia; IL = Israel; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; MX = Mexico; PE = Peru; PL = Poland; 
RU = Russia; SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VE = Venezuela; PH = Philippines; ZA = South Africa. 
1  As a percentage of total average assets, 2003-04 average.   
2  Defined as assets of state-owned banks as a percentage of 
major banks’ total assets, 2003.   
3  Five largest banks’ assets as a percentage of total assets, 2003.   
4  This index is the sum 
of three component indexes: the Strength of External Audit index, the Bank Accounting index and the External Ratings and 
Creditor Monitoring index. Table 7 in Barth et al (2003).   
5  A higher number indicates greater restrictiveness on banking 
activities and ownership. Table 3 in Barth et al (2003). 
Sources: Barth et al (2003); Bankscope; BIS calculations. 130  BIS Papers No 28
 
This is not to say that the direction of causation has run entirely from operational changes to the 
structure of the banking system, rather than the other way around. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the central 
bank of Hungary, indicated that a narrowing of the interest rate corridor was facilitated by the spread 
of overnight money market instruments, and a widening of the range of collateral taken in central bank 
operations has been facilitated by the appearance of new securities such as mortgage bonds. In an 
interesting episode to which we will return later, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) was forced to alter 
its procedures - radically but temporarily - by banking system behaviour. For various reasons, in 1997 
higher short-term interest rates resulting from a tightening of policy were not being translated into 
higher bank retail interest rates. For a period, the NBP offered six- and nine-month deposits directly to 
households, in competition with banks, and at higher rates than being offered by banks. The 
innovation was sufficient to motivate banks to raise retail rates. 
In Asia, central banks also point to an intention to alter the way that the financial system works as a 
substantial part of the reason for changing procedures. In India, for example, the Reserve Bank is 
trying to modernise the financial system. A progressive shift to indirect, market-based policy 
instruments, together with structural reforms and financial liberalisation, has increased the role of 
financial prices in the transmission mechanism (and with that the efficiency with which the financial 
system allocates resources). Observing signs of interest rate stickiness, the Reserve Bank has 
prompted a shortening of the period between interest rate resets on deposits, and is looking to further 
liberalise remaining interest rate controls on contractual savings. Again, direction of causation is not a 
one-way street. The Reserve Bank notes that the process of change has been gradual, and 
predicated on the development of prudential regulation and financial openness. 
In Singapore, monetary operations have been essentially unchanged since 1981. However, changes 
in the way the Monetary Authority of Singapore regulates banks are in general aimed at inducing 
behavioural changes in the financial system. The objective is to further develop financial services as 
an engine of growth. Thailand also serves as an example of causation running in both directions, 
though primarily from changed attitudes towards economic management style to financial regulation. 
Thus the post-crisis economic and financial reforms were collectively aimed at opening Thailand to 
international markets in order to capture some of the benefits from globalisation. All dimensions of the 
financial system were involved. In the process, the Bank of Thailand found that financial sector reform 
led to a breakdown of the quantity relationships previously relied on to implement the monetary 
programming required under IMF financing. This in turn reinforced the move to a price-based 
monetary policy approach. 
In Latin America, causation is also seen to run in both directions. A particularly interesting case is 
Mexico, where changed operating procedures, in the context of the new inflation targeting strategy, 
helped produce the nominal stability needed for the expansion of corporate and household lending. 
Heightened sensitivity to interest rate adjustments is an important consequence. At the same time, the 
changed focus of the new arrangements - in particular, the switch away from exchange rate 
management - has altered exchange rate hedging practices in the wider community. Banks, amongst 
others, are much less exposed to shifts in the exchange rate, allowing the Bank of Mexico to adjust 
interest rates independently of FX market developments. Thus changes in policy approach have 
produced changes in financial system (and wider community) behaviour that have in turn motivated 
further adaptation of policy operations. 
Chile and Colombia provide striking examples of different directions of causation. The Central Bank 
of Chile switched from indexed to non-indexed instruments in mid-2001. A deepening and 
internationalisation of the nominal fixed income market followed this “nominalisation”. In contrast, the 
Bank of the Republic feels constrained in its choice of instruments by the immaturity of the Colombian 
money market. Rather than using the simpler two policy interest rate structure observed in developed 
market settings, a four rate structure is used. The two “inner” rates are the minimum and maximum 
rates accepted at repo and reverse repo auctions respectively, while the “outer” two rates are the 
equivalent of the interest rates on the standing deposit and credit facilities that form interest rate 
corridors in such systems. The spreads between these pairs have narrowed progressively, but the 
Bank of the Republic would clearly prefer to move to a simpler structure when feasible. 
All in all, assessed on the basis of the explanations for changes in operating procedures provided by 
central banks, it appears that central banks are mostly leading rather than following changes in the 
banking system. Some examples of central banks responding to exogenous developments are 
provided, but they are more limited in number, and mostly relate to special circumstances. BIS Papers No 28  131
 
This assessment has important implications for policy. It casts doubt on many of the proposed 
structural or behavioural “preconditions” for the successful implementation of market-based policy 
instruments
9 - preconditions relating to government ownership and control of banks being an important 
exception. Waiting for institutions to evolve before adopting market-based mechanisms might be a 
less successful strategy than promoting that evolution by adopting such mechanisms as part of a 
modernisation programme. In the wider context of financial globalisation, Kose et al (2005) have a 
parallel discussion with a somewhat similar conclusion. They argue that financial globalisation in the 
presence of weak institutions and a fragile financial sector is likely to create costs in the form of poor 
resource allocation and crises. But they further argue that financial globalisation itself promotes 
changes in institutions and financial systems that reduce vulnerability and improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Moreover, these changes are needed if countries are to increase growth. 
3.  Implications for the transmission mechanism 
The adoption of market-based monetary policy operations at the same time as markets have been 
liberalised and opened to international capital markets has had profound effects on the transmission of 
monetary policy. These effects are multidimensional; many enhance but others weaken monetary 
policy. The transmission of monetary policy impulses to interest rates set by financial institutions is 
addressed first, before broadening out the discussion to include other channels of transmission.
10 
The institutional interest rate transmission channel
11 
Market-based monetary policy exploits the incentives of financial institutions to pass on to their 
customers both higher marginal costs of funding - for the sake of maintaining profitability - and lower 
marginal costs of funding - for the sake of acquiring market share. In principle, therefore, liberalisation 
of markets should improve the effectiveness of the interest rate transmission mechanism. Interest 
rates are allowed to respond, constraints on freedom of institutions to act in pursuit of profits are 
removed, more channels of transmission are opened, and monopoly power is constrained by 
additional competition. 
This implies that where the long-term profit motive is a weak force, the adoption of market-based 
instruments might not improve transmission. In financial systems that are dominated by institutions 
whose shareholders either care little about long-term profitability, or who have been unable to institute 
governance arrangements that align managers’ interests with their own, reduced marginal costs of 
funding might not get passed on to customers. Instead, widened net interest margins might be used as 
a source of extra revenue for public projects (in cases where governments or local authorities are the 
main owner of banks), or of rent for managers. Higher marginal costs might also not be passed on 
where managers care less about the bottom line than the goodwill of dominant borrowers, who might 
also be a source of rent for those managers. 
Likewise, in uncompetitive banking markets, banks might be quicker to pass on higher than lower 
funding costs. Early studies of retail bank interest rate behaviour showed the existence of such an 
asymmetry in the United States (see, for example, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992)), where markets might be expected to be more competitive than in the typical EME. In 
the context of six European countries, Mojon (2000) shows that interest rates are more flexible the 
greater is external and within-industry competition. Cotarelli et al (1995) also show a connection 
between interest rate stickiness and competition in Italy. Similar evidence is available for EME cases. 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) estimated the dynamic response of lending rates to changes in money 
                                                       
9  See IMF (2004) for example. 
10  For a general overview of the determination of interest rates, see BIS (1996). 
11  Note that the discussion in this section is couched in terms of the reaction of bank lending rates to changes in bank funding 
costs, treating the latter as synonymous with changes in central bank interest rates. It sets aside the responsiveness of bank 
deposit rates to changes in central bank rates, not because this is unimportant but rather because the same behavioural 
forces are at work, with very similar consequences for the monetary transmission mechanism. 132  BIS Papers No 28
 
market rates for 31 countries, including several emerging market economies. They found substantial 
cross-country differences in the speed and size of lending rate responses, related to five main 
structural factors: government ownership of banks, barriers to entry to the banking market, capital 
controls, the size of the market for short-term monetary instruments, and volatility of interest rates in 
that market. The inflation rate was also found to be relevant to pass-through, with higher inflation rates 
facilitating faster pass-through. Since earlier work had suggested that bank concentration affected the 
speed and size of pass-through from policy rates to lending rates, this was also tested. No such 
relationship was found. The broad conclusion from these analyses is consistent with the idea that 
liberalised financial systems, using market-based policy instruments, show stronger transmission, 
although the evidence is not overwhelming.
12, 13 
A full cross-country, through-time examination of the hypothesis that a stronger role for the profit 
motive, more open and competitive banking systems, and a reduction in regulatory constraints on 
interest rate adjustment have made the interest rate transmission mechanism less sticky is beyond the 
scope of this paper. We instead simply look at changes in interest rate transmission over time for 
indirect confirmation of the hypothesis.  
A crude approach is to examine covariances of lending interest rates with money market interest rates 
in different time periods. This is done in Graph 2. Covariances were calculated for lag lengths ranging 
from 0 to 3 months, with the largest covariances from each period plotted. The support for an increase 
in interest rate pass-through as countries liberalise their financial systems is decidedly mixed. Where 
there are data for the first and second halves of the 1990s, the number of cases showing stronger 
pass-through in the later period is the same as the number showing weaker pass-through. And where 
there are data for both the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, more cases show a 
weakening than show a strengthening in pass-through over time. Nor is the hypothesis that pass-
through strengthens with financial market liberalisation rehabilitated by evidence of a shift towards 
faster, albeit weaker, pass-through. The lag length at which strongest covariance was measured 
increased in almost as many cases as it fell, with even more showing no change. 
A somewhat more sophisticated approach is to estimate pass-through from an error correction model 
where the dynamics are represented by distributed lags. Using such an approach, De Brouwer (1995) 
provided evidence of increasing pass-through from money market to lending interest rates as 
deregulation progressed in western Pacific countries, albeit for an early phase of liberalisation (1980s 
and early 1990s). In most of the emerging market cases in his sample, larger and faster pass-through 
is observed over time (see the first two columns in Table 3).
14 That change is less obvious in the more 
developed country cases where pass-through was higher at the start, and stays roughly unchanged or 
diminishes somewhat in certain periods (especially in Singapore
15). Pass-through generally increases 
for both deposit rates and lending rates, though the rise is larger and faster for the former, perhaps 
explained by higher transactions costs, and a stronger relationship element in lending than deposit-
taking. 
                                                       
12  Studies at the bank level point to the possible importance of other determinants of loan rate stickiness. Berstein and 
Fuentes (2004) identify bank size as important in Chile, along with the proportion of businesses relative to households in the 
loan book and the proportion of non-performing loans (all increasing in stickiness). Gambacorta (2004) finds that bank size 
does not matter in the case of Italian banks, where stickiness is found to be less where banks are illiquid or not 
well-capitalised (ie have low buffer stocks to absorb margin variations), and where the proportion of short-term lending is 
high. Interestingly, Gambacorta finds that heterogeneity of pass-through disappears in the long run. Di Lorenzo and Marotta 
(2005) dispute findings that EMU has increased pass-through in the Italian and Portuguese banking markets, raising doubts 
about banking market openness as an explanator of loan rate stickiness. 
13  It should be noted that the issue of pass-through is related to, but conceptually not the same as, the issue of the 
determination of the average size of bank interest rate spreads. For selected discussions on the latter in an emerging 
market context, see Bensidoun et al (1997), Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000), Afanasieff et al (2001), Demirgüç-Kunt et al 
(2004) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004). 
14  De Brouwer also provided estimates for pass-through from money market rates to deposit rates, and for the period 1980 to 
1984. As these estimates tell essentially the same story, they are not shown. 
15  The reduction in pass-through in Singapore is not surprising in view of the increasing focus on the exchange rate as an 
operating target for monetary policy. The greater the focus of monetary policy on the exchange rate, the more short-term 
interest rates are determined by interest rate differentials with partner countries and other determinants of capital flows 
(Glick and Moreno (1994)), which are only partly related to the domestic conditions relevant for loan pricing. Perhaps more 





Pass-through from money market to domestic loan interest rates 
Cumulative response of loan rate to 1 percentage point rise 
in money market rate after 1 and 12 months 
De Brouwer’s estimates  Updated estimates 
1985-89 1990-94 1990-94 2000-04 
Cum change 
after n months:  1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 
Less advanced  0.18  0.42  0.27 0.78 0.33 0.82 0.48 0.84 
Indonesia 0  0  0.12  0.90 0.12 0.65 0.13 0.68 
Malaysia  0.06 0.43 0.13 0.71 0.21 0.83  (0.02)  (0.20) 
Philippines 0.58  0.83  0.69 0.86 0.80 1.00 0.83 1.00 
Thailand  0.06 0.42 0.13 0.64 0.17 0.81  (0.11)  (0.50) 
More  advanced 0.38 0.67 0.32 0.71 0.19 0.87  ..  .. 
Hong Kong  0.62  0.89  0.52 0.81 0.12 0.83  –  – 
Singapore  0.14 0.45 0.12 0.60 0.26 0.90  (0.41)  (0.87) 
Most advanced  0.62  0.91  0.72 0.88 0.76 0.99 0.78 0.88 
Australia 0.68  1.02  0.49  0.87 0.87 1.00 0.95 1.00 
Japan  0.43 0.65 0.82 0.87 0.36 0.96 0.19 0.52 
Canada  0.57 0.91 0.80 0.95 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 
United States  0.78  1.06  0.78 0.81 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 
Note: Estimates are bracketed where the relevant coefficients are statistically insignificant and/or the adjusted R squared is 
very low. Updated estimates for Hong Kong for the latest period are not sensible, so are not reported (see text). Numbers in 
bold are simple averages of countries in the group for which data exist (excluding bracketed estimates). 
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Consistent with the idea that interest rate pass-through increases as time passes and financial 
systems are deregulated, Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2004) provide evidence that Chile’s interest 
rate pass-through is now similar to that in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and five 
European countries. Chile’s start on the financial liberalisation path was relatively early within the EME 
group. 
The last two columns of Table 3 present updated estimates, using the same methodology as 
De Brouwer (see Annex 1 for details). Presumably because of slightly different data sources, some of 
the estimates in the 1990-94 period are a little different from De Brouwer’s, but the general story that 
more advanced countries with profit-driven banks operating in competitive markets show less lending 
rate stickiness remains intact. 
Because the 1995-99 period was characterised by much turmoil in money and banking markets in all 
of the EME countries in the sample, we chose to confine our updating of De Brouwer’s estimates to 
the 2000-04 period. Here we thought that the post-crisis normalisation of conditions would be 
sufficiently advanced to reveal the underlying relationships associated with the banking system’s 
evolving structure. As it happens, however, in many cases the relationships evident in the early 1990s 
had broken down in the 2000s. This is the case for Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, where 
previously statistically significant coefficients describing both the cointegrating vector in the interest 
rate market and the dynamics of adjustment have become insignificant. (In Hong Kong, the estimated 
relationship shows a statistically significant negative connection between money market and lending 
interest rates, which is counterintuitive so is not reported). And in some other cases the degree of 
stickiness seems to have increased (Indonesia, Japan) notwithstanding noticeable structural change in 
the former case at least. 
This evidence confirms that the relationship between market structure and the performance of the 
interest rate transmission mechanism is complicated. From a cross-country perspective, the standard 
hypothesis still seems supported. But judging from the experience of the crisis-hit Asian economies, 
liberalisation does not automatically translate into more powerful interest rate transmission. 
What might be going on? One structural explanation for reduced responsiveness of lending rates to 
short-term interest rates in these countries concerns the effect of increased globalisation.
16 Although 
the general shift towards more flexible exchange rates suggests greater independence of national 
monetary policies and hence domestic short-term interest rates, the opening-up of capital markets also 
provides borrowers access to alternative sources of funds offshore (as well as onshore). Short-term 
international interest rate differentials tend to move through wider ranges than long-term interest rate 
differentials - increased capital mobility tends to favour the convergence of long-term interest rates 
internationally. One corollary is incomplete pass-through from short-term to long-term interest rates 
domestically, including those attached to term loan contracts. To the extent that interest rates attached 
to shorter-term loan contracts are affected by those attached to longer-term contracts, there might also 
be some spillover to pass-through from short-term funding costs to short-term loan rates. 
Another key reason for weak pass-through, at least during certain periods, might have to do with the 
health of the financial system. Several mechanisms might be involved. Where previous loans or 
investments have gone bad, financial institutions might seek to use increased margins to rebuild 
capital, increase provisioning and write down bad debts. Especially where bank capital has been 
eroded and accounting practices allow banks to hide bad debts, banks might continue to support 
“zombie” firms by “evergreening” impaired loans. Hanging on to bad loans may crowd out 
opportunities to make new good loans, limiting the stimulatory effect of lower interest rates. (There is 
considerable evidence of such an effect at work in Japan in the 1990s and some, though less, 
evidence for banking systems hit by the Asian financial crisis.
17 Certainly, the presence in several 
Asian economies of high levels of non-performing loans and weak corporate lending in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s suggests the possibility of widespread evergreening.) Furthermore, when the banking 
system is in poor health, it is highly likely that the economy is simultaneously facing difficulties. In such 
situations, risk aversion rises and information costs also seem to prevent banks acting 
                                                       
16  Various papers contained in BIS Papers no 23 discuss the effects of globalisation. 
17  See Ahearne and Shinada (2004) and Fukuda et al (2005) for recent examples of research into bank support for zombie 
firms in Japan. Bonin and Imai (2004) provide evidence of bank support for weak firms in Korea. BIS Papers No 28  135
 
countercyclically (by lending to those who can take advantage of opportunities created by the failure of 
others). In fact, Stiglitz-Weiss type credit rationing tends to increase, reducing the sensitivity of lending 
to changes in funding costs. 
This discussion relates to difficulties that central banks experience in stimulating economic activity 
during times when bank balance sheets are in poor shape. Such difficulties often lead to large 
injections of liquidity as central banks push on the proverbial string, with little effect on lending activity. 
Judging by comments provided by central banks, it seems that the overhang of such liquidity also 
means that increases in interest rates can also be difficult to transmit during the recovery phase.
18 For 
example, while Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2002) suggest that Thailand’s problems following the 
financial crisis were likely reasons for more sluggish transmission of stimulatory interest rate impulses, 
the Bank of Thailand’s questionnaire response for this meeting cited the liquidity overhang from that 
period as impeding transmission of higher policy interest rates. 
Similar problems were also cited by the Bank of Korea and the National Bank of Poland. In the latter 
case, when confronted with a negligible effect of higher policy rates on retail interest rates - for both 
deposits and loans - in 1997 the National Bank of Poland competed directly with banks for retail 
deposits. It was successful in motivating banks to compete for funds at higher interest rates, and to 
pass on the higher cost of funds in the form of higher lending rates. It should be noted, however, that 
the existence of a liquidity overhang does not seem automatically to translate into monetary policy 
ineffectiveness with respect to tightening interest rates. The Bank of Japan is currently concerned 
about the risk of an excessive response of interest rates to the prospect of progressive normalisation 
of liquidity conditions. 
Further indirect confirmation that the health of the banking system is part of the explanation for 
weakened interest rate transmission in the first half of the 2000s comes from evidence on pass-
through in Hungary. Horváth et al (2004) estimate pass-through for Hungary for the period 1997 to 
early 2004. Comparing their results with those from earlier research, they conclude that interest rate 
transmission has improved. Although the Hungarian banking sector experienced some post-
liberalisation difficulties, they were not as severe as seen in post-crisis Asia. 
A possible third reason for reduced pass-through echoes the experience of reduced pass-through from 
changes in exchange rates to changes in import prices and thence consumer prices. Put simply, 
greater stability in consumer prices has been accompanied by reduced pass-through. Interest rates 
are also considerably less volatile in the most recent period. As shown in Annex 1, the variance of 
both money market rates and lending rates has fallen by between a third and a half in typical cases. 
Broader channels of transmission 
As just discussed, the evidence on interest rate transmission within the financial institution sector 
provides only mixed support for the argument that adoption of market-based instruments coupled with 
liberalisation of markets makes monetary policy more effective. Overall, however, the evidence for a 
generalised weakening in the transmission mechanism is not strong. 
As Sellon (2002) found in the US context (where some interest rates have become more responsive to 
monetary policy), structural changes such as increased use of variable rate loans and low-cost 
mortgage refinancing have broadened the transmission mechanism. Central banks in developed 
financial markets have generally become more cautious about adjusting interest rates aggressively, for 
fear of provoking overly large responses. The sense of a more powerful transmission mechanism is 
associated with several factors, including: increases in financial leverage, particularly in the household 
sector, increasing its sensitivity to changes in financing costs; the stronger role that induced but 
unpredictable shifts in asset prices might play in affecting wealth and hence spending; and the 
heightened power of expectations channels. 
The view that the overall effectiveness of monetary policy has increased was also reflected in 
responses to questions posed to central banks in preparation for this meeting. Nine out of the 
13 central banks which ventured a conclusion rate their influence over the economy as now stronger 
                                                       
18  The concept of a liquidity overhang and an associated non-linear interest rate transmission mechanism has gained renewed 
respectability following experience in Japan in the 1990s and the resurgence of interest in liquidity traps. 136  BIS Papers No 28
 
than before. The nature of their responses is discussed further below (with reference to Table 4). In 
the meantime, it is worth noting that implicit in a number of the comments offered by central banks is 
the particular role of the credit channel in the overall transmission of monetary policy impulses. 
As noted by Kamin et al (1998), the credit channel is relevant for both financially repressed economies 
and advanced liberalised financial systems. This reflects its two conceptions, one “old” (in terms of the 
economics literature) and one “new”. The old conception concerns quantity rationing by providers of 
credit, predominantly banks, resulting from interest rate and other direct regulations that cause an 
unsatisfiable demand for credit when such regulations are binding. The new conception recognises 
other rationale for the existence of quantity rationing, such as lenders’ responses to information 
problems when assessing the riskiness of borrowers, and risk management practices that involve 
setting quantitative limits on sectoral and connected party exposures. The new conception extends 
beyond quantity rationing, however. Where borrowers are large enough to have access to both banks 
and corporate debt markets, but these sources of finance are not perfect substitutes, changes in 
economic conditions that alter banks’ willingness to lend can lead to shifts in the interest rate spread 
between corporate debt and bank financing.
19 
It has long been understood that the old conception of the credit channel has relevance for EMEs. But, 
as discussed in this paper, its relevance is declining as regulatory restrictions to interest rate and bank 
balance sheet adjustment are removed. The relevance of the new conception of the credit channel for 
EMEs has also been documented in a number of cases. For example, Kim (1999) and Borensztein 
and Lee (2000) show that the credit channel was a powerful force during and after Korea’s late-1990s 
financial crisis; Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2002) provide evidence for the existence of a credit 
channel in Thailand; and Fernandez (2004) provides evidence for Chile. In each case, the theory and 
the evidence relating to the new view of the credit channel point to an important amplification of the 
effects of changes in central bank interest rates on economic activity. 
But it is not entirely clear whether liberalisation of banking systems implies a strengthening or 
weakening of the amplification of monetary policy through the credit channel. One the one hand, a 
strengthening might be expected as more households and firms engage with banks to finance 
expenditures, as leverage increases, and as balance sheets become more sensitive to changes in the 
value of assets. On the other hand, as growing numbers of firms access deeper and more liquid debt 
markets both onshore and offshore, as substitutability of sources of finance increases, as information 
about the state of health of borrowers becomes more readily available, and as corporate governance 
arrangements improve in quality, we could expect a weakening in the role of the credit channel. In the 
absence of time series evidence specifically tracking the evolving performance of the credit channel in 
emerging markets, we are forced to infer the net effect from evidence on the changing power of the 
overall transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and from central bank perceptions of what is 
causing such changes. 
In these respects, the perceptions of EME central banks about the increasing power of the 
transmission mechanism as financial deepening proceeds parallels the evidence available from more 
developed markets. Sellon’s (2002) work has already been cited. A substantial investigation as to the 
implications of financial structure for the transmission mechanism was conducted by the BIS and 
national central banks in 1995 (summarised in Borio (1997b)). That study concluded that monetary 
transmission is relatively more powerful in (developed) countries where agents are more highly 
leveraged and exposed to fluctuations in asset values, where interest rates are more flexible, and 
where non-institutional forms of market finance are more developed.
  
EME central banks in our survey placed particular emphasis on changes in monetary policy regimes 
when explaining their perception that monetary policy is now more powerful (see Table 4). Clearer 
objectives and greater transparency - often in the context of adoption of an inflation targeting 
framework - are thought to have increased the focus and purposefulness of the central bank, and 
thereby the effectiveness of the expectations channel. 
                                                       
19  Kashyap et al (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Ceccetti (1995) and Christiano et al (1998) are prominent 
references in this literature. For a European perspective, see, for example, De Haan (2003) and Ehrmann et al (2001). BIS Papers No 28  137
 
In addition, increasingly flexible exchange rates and the growth of capital markets have broadened the 
range of policy transmission channels to larger enterprises. Several central banks cited the growing 
role of asset prices in the transmission of monetary policy, noting especially the exchange rate and 
prices of traded financial instruments. Frequent reference was made to the broadening of transmission 
channels associated with greater financial depth. Removal of restrictions on access to credit markets, 
increasingly competitive credit markets that innovate in the design of loan contracts, improvements in 
information technology and information management that allow better assessment of credit risk, and 
changes in attitude towards financing of small and medium-sized enterprises as well as households 
are just some of the recent changes that have increased the engagement of such entities with 
financial intermediaries. (These trends are discussed in much more detail in the accompanying paper 
on developments in bank credit.) 
As a result of these changes, a smaller proportion of the private sector - from large enterprises to 
households - is now credit-constrained through lack of access to efficient intermediation services. In 
turn, the utilisation of new-found access to credit is leading to increased leverage and exposure to 
assets whose capital values are in principle sensitive to monetary conditions. Overall, the recent 
evolution of banking markets and financial systems has provided more ways for central banks to 
influence the economy.
20 
The impression of an overall strengthening of the power of monetary policy obtained from surveying 
Table 4 is broadly confirmed in the results from an “opinion survey” of central banks participating in 
this meeting, summarised in Graph 3 below. This opinion survey made a number of statements that 
the respondents were asked to rate as being completely irrelevant to their situation (0), relevant to 
some extent (1), very relevant (2) or completely relevant (3). 
The statements thought by the average respondent to be most relevant describe increased 
effectiveness of monetary policy via expectations-related channels following greater predictability and 
heightened transparency. Greater sensitivity of households to interest rates due to increased leverage, 
and a strengthened exchange rate channel, were also rated as being relevant “to some extent”. 
Interestingly, changed hedging practices of financial institutions, corporates and households were 
considered to be hardly relevant factors in weakening interest rate transmission. This is somewhat in 
contrast with concerns in some developed markets about increased lending rate stickiness resulting 
from, inter alia, more active interest rate risk management by non-financial corporates, longer times 
between mortgage interest rate resets and generally greater optionality available to creditors. One 
possible reason that more fleet-footed interest rate risk management by corporates might not have 
been rated as a factor weakening the interest rate transmission channel is the perception that such 
developments have been offset by correspondingly higher corporate leverage. However, in many if not 
most of the countries surveyed, corporates have been deleveraging over a number of years. This is 
perhaps the reason that the statement relating more effective monetary policy transmission to greater 
corporate leverage found little resonance with respondents. 
 
                                                       
20  Some would argue that these gains come at a price, namely the ability of imperfectly informed agents to use greater 
financial freedom to make greater mistakes that individually might be of no real consequence but collectively might make for 
a more fragile system. For arguments along these lines, see Borio and White (2004). There are other reasons to be 
concerned about the potential for increases in boom-bust behaviour associated with credit market and other imperfections, 
especially in the EME context. Tornell and Westermann (2003) connect booms and busts following financial liberalisations 
to credit market imperfections, including those that generate currency mismatches (on which, see also Goldstein and Turner 
(2004)). Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) connect exchange rate volatility and the credit channel in emerging markets, 


























Factors cited by central banks as influencing the effectiveness of monetary policy in recent years  
  Reducing effectiveness  Increasing effectiveness  Overall effect 
Asia      
China   • IR deregulation Î Ï power IT channel 
• Ï ER flexibility gradually increasing indep of MP 
• Introduction of profit motive in state owned banks Î Ï sensitivity to MP 
• Ï bond market depth + Ï household borrowing Î wider sphere of 
influence for MP 
[Not clear from response. More 
effective indirect channels, but 
early days. Some suggestion that 
direct channels are weaker, but 
not clearly stated.] 
Hong Kong SAR      [Not regarded by HKMA as 
relevant] 
India   • IR deregulation Î Ï power IR channel  More effective (IR stickiness still, 
but declining) 
Indonesia  • Float + liberalisation Î Ï 
relative role of ER, which is less 
amenable to MP influence 
  Less effective 
Korea  • Ð interest elasticity of real 
variables 
• IR operating focus Î more precise control over policy instrument 
• Ï share of banks post-crisis + Ï bond market depth + Ï household 
borrowing Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
More effective 
Malaysia     [Too early to tell] 
Philippines  • Limited signs of reduced pass-
through from money market IR 
to retail IR. Possibly associated 
with NPLs and sluggishness of 
lending. 
• Adoption of IT Î more leverage over expectations 
• Switch from money targeting to IT reduced reliance on unstable 
relationships 
• Financial deepening Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
More effective 
Singapore   • Ï transparency w.r.t. operational target Î more effective influence over 
market 
More effective 
Thailand  • Ð share of banks post-crisis + 
liquidity overhang Î Ð 
sensitivity of retail IR to money 
market IR 

























Table 4 (cont) 
Factors cited by central banks as influencing the effectiveness of monetary policy in recent years 
 Reducing  effectiveness  Increasing effectiveness  Overall effect 
Latin America      
Brazil      
Chile   • Adoption of IT Î more leverage over expectations 
• Financial deepening Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
More effective 
Mexico   • CB independence + adoption of IT Î more leverage over expectations  
• Lengthening of maturities Î Ï sensitivity of banks to IR 
• Financial deepening Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
• Ï transparency w.r.t. operational target Î more effective influence over 
market 
More effective 
Europe      
Czech Republic    • Adoption of IT Î more leverage over expectations 
• Ï experience of CB with IT Î more effective MP 
• Ï household borrowing Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
More effective 
Hungary  • Deregulation + globalisation 
Î Ð role of IR channel 
• Adoption of MP Î more leverage over expectations 
• Deregulation + globalisation Î Ï role of ER channel 
• Private sector willingness to hold FX risk Î Ï role of ER channel 
Mixed 
Russia  • IR channel not very effective  • Switch from money targeting to IT reduced reliance on unstable 
relationships 
• ER channel now more effective (ruble can compete with dollar), but 
creates trade-off for CB wanting to preserve export competitiveness 
• Financial deepening Î wider sphere of influence for MP 
• Ð speculative element in banking Î increased sensitivity to MP 
More effective 
Turkey   • Adoption of IT Î more leverage over expectations 
• More precise control over policy instrument Î Ï power IR channel 
More effective 
ER = exchange rate; IR = interest rates; IT = inflation targeting; MP = monetary policy. 
Source: Central bank responses to a BIS questionnaire.  




Recent changes in the transmission of monetary policy 
0123  
Market-based monetary policy is stronger? 
Market-based monetary policy is weaker? 
Direct policy instruments are weaker? 
Greater predictability of monetary policy is 
increasing the impact of changes in central bank 
interest rates on long rates 
Greater sensitivity of expectations to central 
bank words and actions is increasing the power 
of monetary policy 
Greater leverage is increasing the impact of 
changes in central bank interest rates on 
household behaviour 
Greater exchange rate flexibility is increasing 
the impact of changes in central bank interest 
rates on activity in the export- and import-
competing sectors 
Greater leverage is increasing the impact of 
changes in central bank interest rates on 
corporate behaviour 
Money and debt market immaturity is restricting 
the impact of changes in central bank interest 
rates on market interest rates 
Changed hedging practices within financial 
institutions are slowing the flow-through of 
central bank interest rates changes to financial 
institutions’ customers 
Changed hedging practices of corporates and 
households (eg term borrowing) are slowing the 
impact of changes in interest rates 
International financial market integration is 
increasing the range of intermediation options, 
decreasing the effectiveness of direct controls 
on banks by increasing disintermediation 
Financial institutions are less responsive to 
moral suasion 
Onshore financial deepening is increasing the 
range of intermediation options, decreasing the 
effectiveness of direct controls on banks by 
increasing disintermediation 
Institutions are better at getting around direct 
controls  
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Of particular interest to the issues addressed in this paper is the perceived degree to which immature 
markets are seen as holding back the effectiveness of the interest rate channel of monetary policy. 
However, while this factor was not seen as being entirely irrelevant to the average country surveyed, 
nor did it quite reach the level of being relevant “to some extent”.  
At the same time as the effectiveness of market-based monetary policy is seen as increasing, the 
effectiveness of direct regulations is to some degree seen as being on the wane. Four statements 
relating to increasing difficulty in applying direct controls were rated as being relevant “to some extent”. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
Apart from China and to a lesser extent India, Indonesia, Venezuela and Russia, most countries in the 
emerging markets group have made the transition to full, or near-full, reliance on market-based 
mechanisms for monetary policy implementation, and for the distribution of monetary policy impulses 
through the financial system. Judging from the experience of countries in the group, the adoption of 
market-based mechanisms has more to do with attitudes towards government direction and regulation 
than with the state of development of financial markets. Indeed, market development may be more a 
function of the approach taken by policymakers than the other way around. 
Market-based monetary policy operations in liberalised financial markets may not uniformly improve 
monetary control. Especially for small open economies with few restrictions on capital mobility, 
external financial conditions might dominate, weakening the relative influence of central banks. 
Transmission of monetary policy impulses might also be interrupted when banking systems and/or 
enterprises are in bad health. Evidence of a weakening in the pass-through of changes in central bank 
interest rates can be found in the aftermath of financial crises in some EMEs. 
However, most central banks surveyed for this paper think that monetary policy is now more powerful 
than before. Accompanying changes in monetary policy frameworks, especially those that emphasise 
inflation targets, seem to be the most important factor. These changes harness the expectations 
channel to an extent not present in previous arrangements. In addition, greater financial depth within 
the private sector is thought to be important, consistent with an increased role of credit channel 
effects.  
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Annex 1: 
Estimating interest rate pass-through 
Following De Brouwer (1995) we estimate pass-through of money market interest rates to bank 
lending rates using an error correction model of the following form: 
∑∑
==
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where LendR is the interest rate set on loans by banks, MMR is the money market interest rate (see 
Table 7 in this Annex for data definitions), and β2/β1 is the coefficient on the cointegrating relationship 
between money market and lending interest rates. De Brouwer used a standard general-to-specific 
method to find a suitably parsimonious specification of the dynamics; in general, this involved only the 
contemporaneous change in the money market rate, and in one case (Australia) also the first lag of 
the change in the money market rate. For consistency, we used De Brouwer’s estimating equation: 
ΔLendRt = μ − β1(LendRt−1 − βMMRt−1) + θ0ΔMMRt 
where β = β2/β1. Estimation results are reported in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 
Estimated pass-through from money market to domestic loan interest rates 
1990 Q1-1994 Q4  μ  β1  β  Θ0  N.obs AdjR
2 DW  SE 
Indonesia 0.17  0.08**  1.60** 0.06*  60  0.51  2.50  0.39 
Malaysia 0.68**  0.13**  0.64** 0.06  60  0.37  2.63  0.10 
Philippines 2.38**  0.53**  0.85** 0.49**  60  0.56  2.31  1.01 
Thailand 0.79*  0.13**  0.71** 0.04  60  0.23  1.81  0.36 
Hong Kong SAR  0.74  0.14  0.49* –0.01  48  0.05 1.48  0.33 
Singapore 0.60**  0.17**  0.70** 0.08*  60  0.50  1.66  0.13 
Australia 1.60**  0.33**  0.86** 0.70**  60  0.71  2.14  0.18 
Japan 0.60**  0.22**  0.64** 0.11**  60  0.75  1.30  0.06 
Canada 0.88**  0.54**  0.94** 0.58**  60  0.38  1.80  0.49 
United States  0.45  0.13  0.83** 0.81**  60  0.64  1.61  0.13 
2000 Q1-2004 Q4 
Indonesia 0.80**  0.09**  0.67** 0.03**  60  0.52  1.85  0.14 
Malaysia 0.61  0.02  –10.42 –0.06  60  0.03  2.16  0.06 
Philippines 4.29**  0.73**  0.58** 0.23*  60  0.45  2.02  0.79 
Thailand 0.16  0.05  1.60  0.09 60  –0.00  1.89  0.14 
Hong Kong SAR  –0.43*  –0.10** 1.04**  0.01  60  0.19 0.91  0.17 
Singapore 0.65  0.13  0.27**  0.09** 60  0.12 1.60  0.04 
Australia 0.95**  0.25**  0.94** 0.88**  60  0.89  2.74  0.05 
Japan 0.08**  0.05**  1.77** 0.27**  60  0.41  1.96  0.01 
Canada 1.95**  1.12**  1.00** 1.02**  60  0.93  2.10  0.06 
United States  2.54**  0.85**  1.00** 0.92**  60  0.98 1.97  0.03 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level; ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Source: BIS calculations. 
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The cumulative changes over n (1 and 12) months reported in Table 3 in the text are calculated as: 
∑
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The breakdown in the explanatory power of the equation for Malaysia and Thailand, the reduced 
significance of the error correction term for Singapore, the negative coefficient on the error correction 
term in the second period for Hong Kong SAR and the reduced pass-through evident in Indonesia and 
Japan are together suggestive of a substantial change in the interest rate relationship between the two 
periods. A glance at the data suggests a marked reduction in the variance of both series. That is 
confirmed in the data reported in Table 6. Other potential explanations are discussed in the text. 
 
Table 6 
Volatility of money market and lending rates 
Standard deviation of rates in first differences 
Money market rate  Lending rate 
 
1990-94 2000-04 1990-94 2000-04 
Indonesia 2.24  2.69 0.56 0.21 
Malaysia 0.42  0.04  0.13  0.06 
Philippines 1.66  1.05  1.52  1.06 
Thailand 2.13  0.24  0.42  0.14 
Hong Kong SAR  1.16  0.71  0.34  0.19 
Singapore 0.48  0.22  0.18  0.05 
Australia 0.36  0.15  0.33  0.15 
Japan 0.24  0.03  0.12  0.01 
Canada 0.60  0.22  0.63  0.22 
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Table 7 
Money and loan rate data definitions 
  Money market rate  Lending rate 
Australia  Weighted average short-term rate of outstanding 
loans. † Beginning in January 1995, rate paid on 
unsecured overnight loans of cash as calculated 
by the Australian Financial Markets Association 
and published on Reuters page at 11 am. 
† Beginning in January 1999, weighted average 
rate of the interest rates at which banks have 
borrowed and lent exchange settlement funds 
during the day. The rate is weighted by loan 
amounts. 
Beginning in January 1977, rate charged by 
banks on loans to small and large 
businesses. 
Canada  Rate refers to the overnight money market 
financing rate. Monthly figures are the average for 
the seven days ending the last Wednesday of the 
month.  
Rate that chartered banks charge on large 
business loans to their most creditworthy 
customers; when there are differences 
among banks, the most typical rate is taken. 
Monthly figures are for the last Wednesday 
of the month.  
Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong Kong interbank rate (Hibor) is the annual 
interest rate in Hong Kong dollars on lendings and 
borrowings made between banks in the interbank 
market for a specified period ranging from 
overnight to one year. 
Rate quoted by the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited. 
Indonesia  Rate on one-day loans between commercial 
banks. 
Weighted average rate charged by 
commercial banks on loans to the private 
sector for working capital in national 
currency. Rate is weighted by loan amounts.
Japan  From November 1990, lending rate for collateral 
and overnight loans in the Tokyo Call Money 
Market. Previously, lending rate for collateral and 
unconditional loans. 
Before 1993, the lending rate excluded 
overdrafts. Beginning in 1993, weighted 
arithmetic average of contracted interest 
rates charged by all banks on both short- and 
long-term loans, discounts and overdrafts. 
Malaysia  Weighted average overnight interbank rate. 
Monthly rates refer to the average for the trading 
days of the month. Daily rates are calculated as 
the average of interbank deposit rates for the day, 
weighted by the volume of transactions. 
Weighted average rate offered by 
commercial banks on all loans in national 
currency. The rate is weighted by loan 
amounts. 
Philippines  Weighted average rate on overnight loans 
between commercial banks, thrift banks, savings 
banks and non-bank financial institutions with 
quasi-banking functions to cover reserve 
deficiencies. The rate is weighted by loan amounts. 
Weighted average rate on 91-day treasury 
bills denominated in national currency. Rate 
is weighted by the volume of bills sold. 
Singapore  The rates are the modes of the three-month 
interbank rates quoted by money brokers. Monthly 
data refer to the rates on the last Friday (or working 
day closest to the last Friday) of the month. 
Average minimum rate charged by the 
10 leading commercial banks. 
Thailand  Rate on loans between commercial banks. 
† Beginning in January 1989, daily average of 
commercial banks’ overnight rates for interbank 
lending. 
Minimum rate charged by commercial banks 
on loans to prime customers. 
United 
States 
Federal funds rate: weighted average rate at which 
banks borrow funds through New York brokers. 
Monthly rate is the average of rates of all calendar 
days, and the daily rate is the average of the rates 
on a given day weighted by the volume of 
transactions.  
Base rate charged by banks on short-term 
business loans. Monthly rate is the average 
of rates of all calendar days and is posted 
by a majority of the top 25 insured US 
chartered commercial banks. 
Sources: Thomson Financial for Hibor; IMF International Financial Statistics for all other rates.  
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Annex 2: 
Interest rate corridors 
The use of standing facilities to create corridors to bound the fluctuation of short-term money market 
interest rates is now common in both developed and emerging market contexts. Discretionary open 
market operations were seen as a point of difference between more and less sophisticated central 
banks, with the latter relying more on bank-initiated transactions through standing facilities.
21 From 
the perspective that monetary policy is about controlling the quantum of the money base, 
transactions at the discretion of the central bank seem superior to transactions at the discretion of 
banks. 
Nowadays, however, monetary policy is seen as more about controlling interest rates than the 
money base. Discretionary open market operations are accordingly targeted on achieving a given 
level of short-term interest rates. A number of advanced central banks now use standing facilities 
with quite narrow interest rate spreads (eg +/– 25 bp in the cases of Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand) to determine the prevailing level of short-term money market interest rates, with open 
market operations used for the secondary objective of smoothing liquidity and moderating interest 
rate fluctuations. 
These standing facilities make the quantity of central bank cash explicitly endogenous, by providing 
unlimited access (subject only to collateral requirements and institutional rules on who is eligible to 
maintain current balances with the central bank) to extra cash at the posted interest rate.
22 This 
creates the ceiling for market interest rates. With unlimited access also to a deposit facility at the 
posted rate, the return on the next best alternative use of funds is established, creating a floor for 
market rates. The essential reason for the use of standing facilities to create an interest rate 
corridor is the simplicity and transparency of the corridor arrangement, features that are of at least 
as much value to emerging market central banks as they are to their developed country 
counterparts. 
The operation of a corridor arrangement is illustrated by the Czech Republic’s experience, shown in 
Graph 4. On most days, short-term interest rates in the market are close to the target (two-week 
repo) rate, and well inside the interest rates posted for the lombard (borrowing) facility and the 
deposit facility. Occasionally, where for example liquidity forecasts underlying decisions on the 
quantum of open market operations have gone wrong, or some frictions have prevented full 
allocation of amounts offered at the open market tenders, an unusual surplus or deficit of cash might 
arise. A surplus shows up as a spike in settlement balances at the central bank, often accompanied 
by a dip in the overnight market interest rate towards, but not below, the corridor’s floor. A deficit 
shows up as a spike in the use of the lombard facility, often accompanied by a rise in the overnight 
interest rate towards, but not above, the corridor’s ceiling. As can be seen from Graph 4, liquidity 
surpluses have recently been more common in the Czech Republic, but overnight interest rates 
have only rarely been very far from the policy target rate. 
                                                       
21  For example, Van ‘t dack (1999, p 4) highlighted the point that “a higher proportion of reserves is now supplied through 
operations in open markets, with the use of standing facilities limited to providing marginal accommodation or serving as 
emergency finance” as an example of the modernisation of operating procedures. 
22  Note that in extreme circumstances, central banks might place restrictions on access to the lending window even before 
limits associated with lack of available collateral bind. For example, central banks might be unable or unwilling to raise 
interest rates fast enough to choke off demand for central bank credit. In some crisis situations, the demand for central bank 
credit might become interest-insensitive. In these situations, quantitative limits might be the only means available to avoid 
inadvertently funding a flight to foreign currency, for example.  
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Graph 4 
The interest rate corridor and use of 














Spike to 10.2  [= CZK 89 billion (10.2-1.25)*10] 
Lombard facility interest rate
Deposit facility interest rate
Use of lombard facility Use of deposit facility
 
Note: Use of facilities is measured in units of CZK 10 billion and plotted relative to the corresponding facility’s interest rate.  





Types of market operations employed 





















China  Yes  Yes         
India   Yes  Yes  Yes       
Indonesia  Yes        Yes     
Korea  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Malaysia  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Philippines     Yes  Yes    Yes     
Singapore     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Thailand  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
Argentina  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Brazil  Prohibited   Yes  Yes         
Chile  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Colombia   Yes  Yes       
Mexico  Yes        Yes  Yes   
Peru  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes     
Venezuela  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Czech 
Republic 
Yes    Yes      Yes 
Hungary  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Poland  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Russia   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Israel  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Saudi 
Arabia 
 Yes  Yes  Occa- 
sionally 
   
South 
Africa  Yes    Yes  Yes     
Turkey  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   




























Overall index of non-market monetary policy operations 
Direct instruments  Reserve requirements 



























A B C  D E F  G  H  I  J 
Index factor  5  5  5  1  1 0.1 5  1  1   
China Yes    Yes  Yes  No  6%  Yes  1   15.75 
Hong Kong SAR                    0 
India     Yes  Yes    5%  Yes  1  Yes  9.5 
Indonesia       Yes    9%  Yes  1   5.5 
Korea     Yes  Yes  No  5%    2    8 
Malaysia       Yes    4%    2    1.8 
Philippines     Yes  No  9%    1  Yes  3.9 
Singapore       Yes    3%   2 Yes  2.6 
Thailand       Yes    6%    1    1.6 
Argentina       Yes  No  35%   0    2 
Brazil       Yes  No  45%    1    6.5 
Chile       Yes  No  9%    1    2.9 
Colombia       Yes  No  13%    1    3.3 
Mexico           0%       0 
Peru       Yes  No  20%    2    6 
Venezuela     Yes    15%    2    4 
Czech Republic        Yes    2%    0    1 
Hungary       Yes    5%    0   1 
Poland        Yes   3.5%   0    1 
Russia       Yes    3.5%    2  Yes  2.7 
Turkey       Yes  No  11%    1  Yes  4.1 
Israel       Yes  No  6.3%    2  Yes  4.26 
Saudi Arabia        Yes  No  7%    2  Yes  4.4 
Note: Column C: China uses window guidance to influence the structure of credit; India has measures to direct credit towards the rural sector; Korea uses the Aggregate Credit Ceiling system to 
direct credit towards small and medium-sized enterprises. Column H takes value of 0 if required reserves are remunerated at fully or at very near market rates, 1 if partially remunerated and 2 if 
mostly not remunerated. Column J is calculated as {Σ(A..C) + [D+E+(F*G*H)] + I}. 
Sources: National sources; Hawkins (2005).  
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